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LAW REVIEWS AND ACADEMIC DEBATE 
Erik M. Jensen* 
This essay makes a simple point: When a law review publishes an article, 
the editors should be willing both to publish responses to that article and to 
give the author a chance to reply to critics. This shouldn't be a contr.oversial 
principle, but, for far too many reviews today, it's not standard procedure. 
Law reviews are different from journals in other academic disciplines, and 
we professors all make the same, often unfair complaints about student-
edited reviews. The students aren't in a position to make informed decisions 
in selecting articles; 1 they're faddish; they can't write but they insist on 
redoing even the occasional article that's already well-written; they want 
citations for everything, including the proposition that "the sun is hot;"2 and 
so on. 
Well, we know that students like a good fight, and one might therefore 
have thought that student-edited reviews, whatever their faults, would be 
interested in furthering vigorous debate. I had thought that, but now I'm not 
so sure. 
Not long ago, I had an article published in the Columbia Law Review.3 I , 
think the article was pretty good, actually, but I was lucky to place it in such 
a prestigious place, particularly since I. don't teach at one of the top twenty 
law schools. The article dealt.with an arcane subject, the meaning of the 
·"direct-tax" clauses in the Constitution, which had been largely ignored for 
· .decades. I argued, with more-than a little evidence, that the clauses actually 
meant something originally, and thatthey might have relevance today. 
So far, so good. A nice little (actually not so little) academic article on a 
subject of almost no general interest. Or so I thought (and still think). 
Yale Professor Bruce Ackerman must have been really offended by my 
article, and he wrote a response, published in Columbia a little over a year 
later.4 It was a bombshell. Along the way he used terms like "the legacy of 
• David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
1. Actually, I've always thought that helped my chances in placing articles. 
2. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 798 (15th ed., 1977) (entry on "sun"). 
3. Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes:" Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 
COLUM. LAW REV. 2334 (1997). 
4. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L REV. 1 (1999). The Ackerman article 
isn't characterized as a response, but mine is the first work cited iu note 1, and a chunk of the article deals 
only with my piece. It's fair to say that Ackerman's piece would have been very different had it not been 
for my article 
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racism," "intemperate," "hash," and "enterprising" (not intended as praise) 
to describe my work.5 A colleague characterized the Ackerman article as the 
definitive statement of my incompetence. And if a Yale professor said it in 
the Columbia Law Review, it must be true. 
I was horrified, but, once I'd convinced myself I could write a rebuttal, I 
calmed down. I felt even better when two colleagues told me that "Columbia 
has to let you reply." They were sure Columbia wouldn't publish an attack 
like Ackerman's without letting the victim respond. If nothing else, the 
Review should want a defense of an article-mine-that it had published. 
So I sent the Columbia editor-in-chief a note to say a reply would be 
coming. The marketplace of ideas could operate, with an interchange of 
ideas published in a visible place. Isn't that the way things are supposed to 
work in academic journals?6 We might have to negotiate about length and 
tone, but surely there could be no question about my entitlement to reply in 
some way. 
You can guess what happened. I drafted a reply-one that was probably 
too long and intemperate, but one that, to my mind, shredded many of 
Professor Ackerman's pdsitions.7 I sent it to Columbia about a month after 
my-never acknowledged-letter to the EIC. A couple of weeks later, 
Columbia decided to "pass." I was told the debate should proceed in a 
different forum because, taking into account another article in the pipeline 
(more about that later), the Columbia editors didn't wantto devote any more 
space to taxation and the Constitution. 
For a professor at a top-ten institution, a rejection like that wouldn't have 
mattered .. (Of course, none ofthis would have happened to such a professor. 
Columbia would have published his reply.) The top-ten professor could have 
gotten his response in another top journal-his home review, if nowhere 
else. But for someone like me, from a school outside the top ten, the 
alternatives were fewer. No one's going to publish an article of mine just 
5. I d. at 30 n.112 ("legacy of racism"); id. at 53 ("intemperate"); id. ("hash"); id. at 52 ("[G]enerations 
of academic neglect of the constitutional issues makes [sic] it easy for ente;rprising scholars to 'rediscover' 
the 'direct tax' clauses, and urge their resuscitation without serious consideration of their origins in 
slavery."). 
6. For six-and-a-half years, I was one of the editors of the Journal of Legal Edflcation, the scholarly 
journal of the Association of American Law Schools. We made a point of publishing every response to 
articles we published (as long as it was in fact a response and the length was appropriate-we weren't 
going to publish a 50-page "response" to a 10-page article). And we always gave the author of the original 
article the opportunity to reply to his or her critics. 
7. You don't have to agree with my characterization of the relative merits of Ackerman's and my 
arguments. It's enough for present purposes if you accept the proposition that my article might have had 
some merit and that some of Ackerman's criticism of me might have been subject to question. 
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because I wrote it, and other reviews might very well resist publishing a 
reply to an article that had appeared elsewhere. 
Indeed, since my unhappy experience, many people have told me how 
difficult it is to get a reply to a particular article published if the original 
journal won't take it. Unless the respondent is prestigious enough, the 
Southern North Carolina Law Review doesn'twant to hear about an article 
published in Columbia; that's someone else's problem. And my situation 
was even worse: the chain of events gave student editors reason to question 
the quality of my work. I'd been trashed by a prominent person in a 
prominent journal. The Columbia editors had apparently declared the war 
over, with Ackerman the winner. Why else would Ackerman's attack have 
gone unchallenged in the Columbia Law Review? 
In a telephone conversation to discuss why Columbia wouldn't publish my 
reply, I was assured that readers could study both my article and Ackerman's 
and make their own rational, dispassionate judgments about quality-that I 
shouldn't be afraid my work would be damaged just because Bruce 
Ackerman had condemned it in the Columbia Law Review. That's a nice 
sentiment, but it bears no relationship to reality. Not all readers will study 
two competing conceptions of the universe; many will evaluate relative 
quality by looking at pedigrees of authors and places of publication. If I'm 
denied the opportunity to respond to a Yale professor in a top-tier review, 
it's worse than losing a battle; it's as if I'm not permitted on the same 
battlefield. 8 
I realize this sounds like a personal grievance, and it is that in part, but 
there are lessonsofmore general interest to be learned. One of the problems 
is that, while law reviews may be institutions with long-term interests and 
obligations, they're without many of the usual characteristics of institutions. 
The people minding the store don't necessarily have the long term in mind. 
Student editors turn over annually. That's not enough to avoid bedsores, 
but it's too often to preserve continuity in academic journals. What appeared 
in any student-edited journal a year or two ago is ancient history to the 
current editors; the work was someone else's responsibility and the 
published authors are nothing but names on the page. The new editors are 
very smart people, but they start with their own agendas. Dealing with 
leftover problems isn't high on their list of priorities. 
8. My reply to Professor Ackerman appeared in a perfectly fine place, see Erik M. Jensen, Taxation 
and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct-Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL. 687 (1999), but it took two 
years to come out, and it wasn't Columbia. I also discuss Ackerman's positions in Erik M. Jensen, The 
Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of"Jncomes," 33 ARJZ. ST. L.J. 1075 (2001). 
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That needs to change. Law reviews should provide better fora for 
discussion of issues raised in their pages. The editors must understand, at 
more than an abstract level, that the reviews exist to further dialogue, that 
sometimes the dialogue needs to continue in a single journal, and that the 
editors have an obligation to publish some articles that don't necessarily 
coincide with their individual, short-term intellectual interests. And they 
need to understand the public consequences of rejecting certain pieces once 
they've permitted a debate to open up. To bring all of this back to my 
experience: if the Ackerman piece was going to be published in the form that 
it was, then certain obligations should have arisen from that decision by the 
Columbia editors. 
I'm not arguing that law reviews have to publish anything and everything 
sent them by aggrieved authors. I was open to negotiation about length and 
tone of reply. If I'd been told I would be limited to five or ten pages, so that I 
could get my complaint on paper and note that a full reply would appear 
elsewhere, I would have understood. (I wouldn't have been happy, but I 
would have understood.) Nothing like that happened. 
And you know what? The mysterious "article in the pipeline," the 
purported reason for not publishing any more articles on taxation and the 
Constitution in Columbia, turned out to be a direct response to my article.9 I 
wasn't being given a chance to reply because Columbia was publishing yet 
another article criticizing my work! When I read this second essay, even 
though it was respectful in tone, I started feeling as if I were being used.for 
target practice in the Columbia Law Review. I contacted the editors once 
.again, graciously offering to limit myself to five pages in responding to both 
of my critics. No dice. 
***** 
If authors can't respond to their critics in the same law review, and if 
other journals are unlikely to publish pieces that are primarily responses to 
articles published elsewhere, what happens? Either the responses don't get 
published at all, or the authors have to hide the responses in the endless 
prose of longer, more general works. In either case, it' shard to see how 
scholarship benefits, 
Except for the occasional, really path breaking article-the piece that 
redefines or creates a field of study-scholarship is incremental. Academic 
articles build on other academic articles. Author A uses author B' s study as 
9. See Lawrence Zelenak, Essay: Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious 
Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1999). 
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the basis for a new examination of the duty of care owed in geriatrics. Or 
author C challenges B' s characterization of the Ohio jurisprudence on 
products liability. In tum, B almost certainly has interesting things to say 
about A's work, and B can perhaps point to holes in C' s criticism. When 
many minds are engaged in the study of similar or related issues, everyone's 
work should benefit. 10 And, yes, although it may sound pretentious to say so, 
the refinement of ideas through the academic process of point/counterpoint 
improves the state ofknowledge. 11 Any law review policies that frustrate the 
process of intellectual engagement should be treated as suspect. (That's a 
polite way of saying they should be discarded.) At a minimum, legal journals 
shouldn't be cutting off debate that begins in their pages, something that, as 
I've been arguing, happens much too often. 
Happily, and despite the grumpy tone of this essay, help may be on the 
way. Many academic journals, and now a few law reviews, have a 
"correspondence," "communications," or "letters" section to deal with 
controversies about work that appears in their volumes (and sometimes in 
other journals as well). Critics write; original author responds. That 
exchange might end the debate, or it might then continue in another forum. 
Correspondence sections are a wonderful development that ought to 
become universal in law reviews, at least until someone comes up with a 
better solution to a very real problem. So if you don't like this essay, fire 
away. I'm ready to return the fire. 
10. Which isn't to say that the process is painless for those engaged in it. Criticism hurts, even 
(especially?) when deserved. 
11. The totally new article--one that depends not at all on work that has come before--is the exception, 
not the rnle, in legal scholarship. And that's generally a good thing; incrementalism has much to 
recommend it. Totally new thoughts on legal matters are generally new because they're bizarre, not 
because they're worth serious attention. Cf Daniel A. Farber, Commentary: The Case Against Brilliance, 
70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 917 (1986) ("The same traits of novelty, surprise, and unconventionality that are 
considered marks of distinction in other fields should be considered suspect in economics and law, in 
which thoughtfulness may be a more important virtue.") (footnote omitted). The law is at some level tied 
to human nature, which (the last time I looked) doesn't change on a daily basis. 
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